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SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
SELF-DEFENCE AS A PRIMARY RULE AND SELF-DEFENCE AS A SECONDARY 
RULE 
Nicholas Tsagourias  
Abstract: This article examines the law of self-defence as applied to non-state 
attacks in light of the coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syria. It critiques the 
two current interpretations of the law of self-defenceȄone based on 
attribution and the other on  Ǯ  ǯ testȄfor failing to 
address adequately the security threat posed by non-state actors or for not  
addressing convincingly the legal issues arising from the fact that the self-
defence action unfolds on the territory of another state. For this reason, it 
proposes an alternative framework which combines the primary rule of self-
defence to justify the use of defensive force against non-state actors, with the 
secondary rule of self-defence to excuse the incidental breach of the 
territorial ǯǤ 
Words: self-defence, non-state actors, ISIL, ǡ Ǯable or unǯ
substantial involvement, circumstances precluding wrongfulness  
Introduction  
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In recent years, ISIL has emerged as the most powerful and brutal jihadist group 
posing Ǯ         ǯǤ1 In 
contrast to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, ISIL has a territorial basis, having 
seized large swathes of Iraqi and Syrian territory, from where it can plan and 
organise its nefarious activities and attack states, including Syria and Iraq. In 
response to such attacks, Iraq requested external assistance2 and a US-led coalition 
of states launched air strikes against ISIL in both Iraq and Syria. Although the strikes 
against ISIL in Iraq were conducted with the consent of the Iraqi government,3 Syria 
did not consent to the US-led strikes; but the majority of states involved in the air 
campaign against ISIL in Syria invoked their right of individual and/or collective self-
defence. According to the US4:  
ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to 
many other countries, including the US and our partners in the region and 
beyond. States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the 
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations, when, as is the case here, the government of 
the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of 
its territory for such attacks. The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will 
not confront these safe-havens effectively itself. Accordingly, the US has initiated 
                                                          
1 SC Res 2249 (2015) 
2 Ǯ ? ? ? ? ? ?ent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations ǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌȀ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?Ǥ 
3  ǮIdentical letters dated 25 November 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General       ǯ ȋ26 November 2014) UN Doc S/2014/851. For consent as 
justification for the use of force in another state see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) (Merits) [2005] ICJ Rep 168 para 47. 
4 Ǯ ? ? ? ? ? ?
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-Generǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌȀ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?Ǥ 
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necessary and proportionate military actions in Syria in order to eliminate the 
ongoing ISIL threat to Iraq. 
Similarly, Turkey invoked its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence 
since Ǯthe regime in Syria is neither capable of nor willing to prevent these [ISIL] threats 
emanating from its territory which clearly imperil the security of Turkey and safety of 
its nationalsǯ.5 In the same vein, Australia stated that its action is Ǯin support of the 
collective self-defence of Iraqǯ and that ǮStates must be able to act in self-defence when 
the Government of the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent 
attacks originating from its territory.ǯ6 
The UK Parliament initially authorised strikes only in Iraq following in response 
to the request by the Iraqi government but refused to authorise strikes within Syria.7 
However, the Gǯview was that the collective self-defence of Iraq can justify 
action inside Syria and that the UK can exercise its "inherent right of self-defence" 
against specific threats emanating from Syria as when it targeted two British citizens in 
Syria.8  In November 2015, the UK Parliament authorised strikes against ISIL in Syria 
                                                          
5 Ǯ ? ? ? ? ? ?±ǯǤǤǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌȀ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?Ǥ 
6 UN Ǯ   ?   ? ? ? ?         ǯȋ ? ? ? ? ?ȌȀ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?Ǥ 
7 Policy paper, Summary of the government legal position on military action in Iraq against ISIL (25 
September 2014) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/military-action-in-iraq-against-isil-
government-legal-position/summary-of-the-government-legal-position-on-military-action-in-iraq-
against-isil (accessed 30 November  2015). HC Deb 26 September 2014, vol 585, col 1266 
8 HC Deb 7 September 2015, vol 559, col 25-27. Also  Ǯetter dated 7 September 2015 from the        
    ǯ ȋ ? 
2015) UN Doc S/2015/688 . House of Commons Foreign A ǡ Ǯ      ǯǡ      ? ? ? ?-16 HC 457 (3 November 2015), 12. 
Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, ǯ  	
Select Committeeǯ      ? ? ? ?-16: The Extension of Offensive British Military 
Operations to Syria, November 2015  http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/foreign-affairs/PM-Response-to-FAC-Report-Extension-of-Offensive-British-Military-
Operations-to-Syria.pdf. (accessed  30 November 2015).  ǡ Ǯ  ack in Syria: legal 
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ruling out at the same time any deployment of troops.9 
France justified its action by invoking its right to self- Ǯin response to ǯ, whereas after 
the Paris attacks of November 13, 2015, it labelled its previous action as collective self-
defence and its subsequent action against ISIL inside Syria as individual self-defence.10  
The international reaction to the strikes was rather muted with only a handful of 
critical voices. Russia condemned the strikes because, in her view, they were carried out 
without Security Council authorisation or approval by the Syrian government.11 Yet it 
should be recalled that self-defence does not require Security Council authorisation or 
host state consent. Russia was later involved in military action inside Syria apparently 
with the consent of the Syrian government.12  
Syria complained to the UN Secretary-General about the French, British and 
Australian strikes. Syria claimed that the self-defenc  Ǯ ǥ the 
intention of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations [and] is blatantly inconsistent 
                                                                                                                                                                                     ǯ ȋ  ǡ   ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?  ? ? ? ?ȌǢ  ǡ Ǯ   ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?Ȍ 
 
9  HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323. Claire Mills, Ben Smith and Louisa Brooke-ǡ ǮȀǣ ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?-32.  
  
10 ǮIdentical letters dated 8 September 2015 from the Permanent  Representative of France to the United  
Nations addressed to the Secretary-
ǯS/2015/745 
(9 September 2015). Conseil de sécurité - Résolution 2249 contre le terrorisme - Intervention de 
M. François Delattre, représentant permanent de la France auprès des Nations Unies - 20 novembre 2015. 
http://www.franceonu.org/Face-a-Daech-nous-avons-l-humanite-en-commun 
11 ǮSelf-ǫ	ǯ-ǯSputnik International (27 September 2015) 
<http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150927/1027618121/airstrikes-france-isil.html#ixzz3nIfyFro8> 
accessed at 19 October 2015 
12 Lawmakers authorize use of Russian military force for anti-IS airstrikes in Syria 
http://tass.ru/en/politics/824795 accessed at 19 October 2015 
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with the Charter and the resolutions of the Security Councilǯ.13 Yet it did not explain why     ǯ interpretation of Article 51 is distorted. The Syrian 
government also declared Ǯ[i]f any State invokes the excuse of counter-terrorism in 
order to be present on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian Government, ǯ airspace or territorial waters, its actions shall be      ǯ   Ǯ    ǡ        Ǥǯ14 It transpires that 
Syria did not denounce the coalition action as violating Article 2(4) of the Charter 
prohibiting the use of force but as violating its sovereignty.  
 From the preceding overview of state justifications, self-defence (individual or 
collective) emerges as the main justification for the air strikes against ISIL in Syria. Yet 
this justification is not without its problems, mainly because ISIL is a non-state actor and 
because the strikes unfold on the territory of Syria, a sovereign state, not itself 
implicated in the attacks.  
In this article, I will first present the two most prominent approaches to the use 
of defensive force against non-state attacks and analyse their reasoning. The first relies 
on attribution that is, the attribution of the non-state attack to a state that subsequently 
becomes the target of the self-defence action, whereas the second relies on the inability 
or unwillingness of the host state to suppress the non-state attack. In ǯview 
these approaches fail to address the full gamut of legal and security issues that non-state 
attacks give rise to. I will therefore put forward an alternative framework based on the 
                                                          
13 Identical letters dated 17 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab 
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security 
Council S/2015/719 21 September 2015 
14 Ibid 
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interaction between self-defence as a primary rule and self-defence as a secondary 
rule.15 To explain, whereas primary rules contain substantive rights and obligations or, 
to put it slightly differently, prescribe or proscribe certain conduct, secondary rules 
establish the conditions under which a primary rule is breached and the consequences 
that flow from such a breach. The law of state responsibility is, for instance, a regime of 
secondary rules which apply generally and uniformly to all breaches of primary rules. 
Self-defence as a primary rule is contained in Article 51 of the UN Charter and in 
customary law according to which the defensive use of force in response to an armed 
attack is lawful per se; there is no wrongfulness and no question of responsibility arises 
provided that the self-defence action adheres to the conditions set by law. Self-defence 
as a secondary rule is contained in Article 21 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts according to which self-defence can exonerate 
breaches of certain international obligations16 Consequently, whereas the primary rule 
of self-defence can justify the use of force against non-state attacks, the secondary rule 
of self-defence can exonerate incidental breaches of obligations owned to the state on 
whose territory the action takes place provided that they are committed in the course of 
self-defence. This framework, it is hoped, provides a more systematic conceptual and 
legal treatment of the use of defensive force against non-state attacks.  
 
                                                          
15 On the distinction between primary and secondary rules see James Crawford, The International Law 
ǯ     (CUP 2002) 14- ? ?Ǣ Ǥ ǡ Ǯ         ǣ  ǯ  ? ?  ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?-879. 
YBILC (vol II, part II) 1980, 27A.  
16 International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(2001).  
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Self-defence on the basis of attribution 
The first approach to self-defence against non-state attacks relies heavily on the law 
of state responsibility in order to identify the state responsible for the armed 
attack.17 Self-defence according to this approach is an inter-state affair involving the 
state that suffers an armed attack and the state responsible for the attack. The Ǯresponǯof self-defence is performed through the device of attribution as 
formulated in the law of state responsibility. This approach is most evident in the ǯ Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion where the Court 
opined tha     Ǯ   by 
one State against another Stateǯ but since the attacks against Israel were not Ǯǯǡ-defence was not relevant.18 Conversely, if an attack 
is not attributed to a state, the victim state cannot use defensive force against 
another state or on its territory unless the use of force is authorised by the Security 
Council19 or is requested by the territorial state.20  
                                                          
17 Article 51 UN Charter 
18Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep para 139; Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of 
America) ȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ?ǣǮǥǯǤibid para 61. 
19 It should ne noted that SC Res 2249 (2015) did not authorise strikes against ISIL in Syria but, instead, 
endorsed the legal justifications offered by states such as self-defence or consent.  Dapo Akande and  ǡ Ǯ      ǯ  ǯ 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constructive-ambiguity-of-the-security-councils-ISIL-resolution/ (accessed at 
31 December 2016) 
 
20   ǯǡ Ǯ ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?Ǣ  ǡ ǮThe   ǣ    ǯ ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ? ?AJIL 570, 572; 
Constantine AǡǮForce by Armed Groups as Armed Attack and the Broadening of Self-Defence, 
55 Neth. ILRev 159, 169Ȃ71 (2008). 
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Attribution takes place on the basis of an institutional, a functional and an agency 
test.21 The institutional test is contained in Article 4 ASR according to which an attack 
will be attributed to a state if it has been committed by a de jure or a de facto organ of 
that state.22 Following the functional test, an attack will be attributed to a state if it has 
been committed by an entity that is empowered by that state to exercise governmental 
authority or is committed by an organ of another state that has been placed at the 
disposal of the first state.23 According to the agency test as formulated in Article 8 ASR, 
there needs to be an ad hoc relationship between a state and the non-state actor that 
commits the attack which is established when the state instructs or directs the non-state 
actor to attack24 or when the state exercises Ǯcontrolǯ over the specific non-state 
attack. 25  
It becomes apparent then that the attribution criteria in the law of state 
responsibility require very close links between a state and a non-state actor in order to 
hold states responsible for non-state acts. Yet, non-state actors may collaborate with 
states in more subtle ways than the ones envisaged by the existing attribution tests or 
they may have the resources to act independently. Furthermore, non-state actors may 
operate from failed or failing states in which case the attribution criteria become almost 
redundant. This is the case for example with ISIL. Its attacks cannot be attributed to 
                                                          
21 ǤǤǡǮ		ǫǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
15 Melbourne JIL, 1. 
22 Art 4 ASR; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) [1986] 
para 109 (hereinafter refereed to as Nicaragua Case); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment of 26 
February 2007) [2007] ICJ Rep paras 307, 385, 390-393 (hereinafter referred to as Bosnia Genocide Case). 
J. Crawford, State Responsibility-The general Part (CUP, 2013) 124-126. 
23 Articles 5 and 6 ASR. 
24   ? Ǣ   	ǡ Ǯ     ǣ  ǯ  
Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of International responsibility (OUP 2010) 257, 
267; Crawford, State Responsibility, 145. Bosnia Genocide Case, para 400. Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3 para 58; 
Nicaragua Case (Separate Opinion of Judge Ago) para 16. 
25 Nicaragua Case, paras 116-117; Bosnia Genocide Case, paras 398, 402-406, 413-414.  
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Syria or to any other state because ISIL is not a de jure or de facto organ of Syria or of 
any other state, it does not exercise governmental authority over parts of Syria on behalf 
of the Syrian Government and does not act under the instructions, direction or control of 
any state. Moreover, ISIL operates from areas that are not controlled by the Syrian 
Government.  
It thus transpires that applying the attribution tests of the law of state 
responsibility to non-state attacks creates a void which non-state actors, either 
independently or in collusion with states, can exploit to attack with impunity other 
states, whereas victim states are left with no lawful means of defence. Such legal 
incapacitation may delegitimise states to the extent that defence and security are a ǯ   but may also delegitimise international law because it 
would permit non-state actors and colluding states to infringe interests and rights 
protected by international law.  
For this reason, attempts have been made to either ease or expand the attribution 
criteria whilst maintaining at the same time the state-centred reading of self-defence.  
First, it has been suggested that with regard to organised groups the requisite 
level of state control over non-state actors who commit armed attacks should be 
lowered from effective to overall control.26 Overall control is about the general influence 
that a state may exert over an organised group, shaping its actions, but does not require 
proof of state involvement in specific acts as it is the case with effective control. As    ǡ   Ǯelds overall control over the group, not only by 
equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general 
                                                          
26  ǡ Ǯ   Ǯ ǯǣ    -Defense, Article 51(1/2) of the UN ǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ȋ ?ȌFletcher Forum of World Affairs 35, 47 
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ǯǡadded that Ǯǡǡ
State should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, instructions for ǯǤ27  
Secondly, state complicity in the activities of non-state actors has been 
promulgated as an additional attribution criterion.28 State complicity includes active but 
also passive support in the form of harbouring or tolerating non-state actors and their 
activities. The US for example justified its self-defence action against Afghanistan 
following the Ǯ9/11ǯ attacks because the attacks Ǯhave been made possible by the 
decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan it controls to be used by 
this orga  ǯ Ǯespite every effort by the United States 
and the international community, the Taliǯ.29 
The Security Council endorsed this argument in Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 
(2001) by affirming the USǯ inherent right to self-defence. In the same vein, the OAS 
condemned the Ǯ ?Ȁ ? ?ǯattacks and declared t Ǯ   ǡ
                                                          
27   æ © ȀȀ ǲǳ (Appeal) ICTY-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 131, 137 (© ȌǤǮǯǤBosnia Genocide 
para 404. See A. ǡ Ǯ    © tests revisited in light of the ICJ judgment on ǯ ? ?EJIL (2007), 649 
28 Christian Tams, Ǯ  	  ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ?   ? ? ?Ǣ Ǥ ǡ Ǯ 
Forcible Acts to States: Connections Between the Law on the Use of Force and the Law of State ǯNiels M. Blokker and Nico J. Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory 
and Reality - A Need for Change? (Brill, 2005) 160-164 (only if there is knowledge, forseeability, intent and 
causation). 
29 ǮLetter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations 
addresseǯȋ ?  ? ? ? ?ȌȀ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?Ǣ Ǯ   ǯ           
  
Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President    ǯ ȋ7 October 
2001) UN Doc S/2001/947. 
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supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these acts are ǯ.30  
The immediate question is what is the legal stat   Ǯ ǯ  
complicity standard? It may be contended that they constitute lex specialis that is, special 
attribution criteria of the use of force regime.31 It should be recalled that whereas the ICJ 
rejected in the Bosnia Genocide Case Ǯǯ, Ǯlogic 
does not require the same test to be adopted in resolving the two issues which are very   ǯǤ32  ǯ      legal space for the 
development of special attribution rules, yet, whether the aforementioned standards 
have thus been established has been challenged by commentators.33 That having been 
said, even if they were to apply to ISIL attacks, they could not be attributed to Syria or 
Iraq since neither state provides the required level of support.  
It thus becomes apparent that the attribution approach to self-defence either in 
its narrow or in its more expansive formulation does not solve the security problems 
posed by non-state actors such as ISIL.  
This is not the only flaw of this approach. It most important flaw is conceptual 
because it conflates the law of state responsibility with the law on the use of force; two 
                                                          
30 Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, Twenty-third 
Meeting of Consultation OEA of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, /ser.f/ii.23 rc.23/res.1/01, September 21, 
2001 at http://www.oas.org/oaspage/crISIL/RC.23e.htm. 
31 See Articles 55 and 59 ASR.  
32 Bosnia Genocide Case paras 402-405. 
33 Ruys, Armed Attack, 490-2;  ǡ ǮTerrorism Is also Disputing some Crucial Categories of ǯ, 12 EJILǤ  ? ? ?ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǢ
Ǥ
ǡ Ǯǯǡȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ?ICLQ, 
537. For lex specialis see ǡǮǣ
ǯǤ
Crawford et als (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP, 2010), 221. 
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legal regimes with different rationales, content and exigencies as explained previously.34 
The use of force regime is a regime of primary rules which set out the circumstances and 
conditions under which force can be lawfully used in international relations. For 
example, Article 51 of the UN Charter establishes a legal entitlement to use force when 
an armed attack occurs irrespective of its author or of issues of responsibility. The law of 
state responsibility sets out the conditions and methods for holding states responsible 
for violations of their international obligations. Attribution in the law of state 
responsibility is thus the mechanism according to which non-state acts are transformed 
into state acts or, to put it in different terms, non-state acts  Ǯǯ 
purposes of responsibility.35 It is for this reason that the law of state responsibility 
requires compelling state input into non-state acts or non-state actors namely, in order 
to distinguish private from public (state) acts.36  
Because of the different content and rationale of the two regimes, questions arise 
as to the function and propriety of such inter-systemic transfer. More specifically, 
questions arise as to why secondary rules of attribution should determine the content 
and scope of the primary rules on the use of force. With regard to the law of state 
responsibility, questions arise about the possible effects on the coherence of the law of 
state responsibility of the emergence of differentiated attribution standards. Such 
standards may metastasise to the law of state responsibility challenging the whole 
edifice of a unitary and common system of secondary rules which underpins the 
                                                          
34 Mahmoud Hmoud, 'Are New Principles Really Needed? The Potential of the Established Distinction 
Between Responsibility for Attacks by Nonstate Actors and the Law of Self-Defenseǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǤǤǡǮAttribution of Forcible Acts to States 133-171 (for whom there is connection between the 
law of state responsibility and the use of force). Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Merits, 
declaration of Judge Koroma, para 9. 
35 Art 2 ASR; 	ǡǮǯ  270 
36 ILC Articles on State responsibility, 38. Bosnia Genocide Case para 406. 
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institution of international responsibility. If that is to happen, the law of state 
responsibility may gradually and steadily extend beyond its current codification but as 
the ICJ warned with regard to the use of the Ǯǯ standard, it would Ǯ
too far, almost to a breaking point, the connection which must exist between the conduct ǯǯ.37 By rejecting this standard, the 
ICJ contained the attempted expansion of the law of state responsibility and reassured 
states.   
 
 
Self-defence on the basiǮunable or unwillingǯ test  
Ever so often in recent yearsǡǮable or unǯ38 test to justify 
the use of defensive force on the territory of a state against non-state attacks. Indeed, 
the US, Australia and Turkey among others relied on this test to justify their action 
against ISIL in Syria, whereas the UK and France relied on self-defence without 
mentioning the Ǯunable or unwillingǯ test, at least in official documents, although they 
alluded to that test. For example, the UK Prime-Minister justified the targeted killing 
of two British nationals in Syria under the rubric of self-defence Ǯbecause there was 
                                                          
37 Bosnia Genocide Case para 406. 
38 ǡǮ	-ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ?ICLQ 963, Principle F, 969-70;   ǡ Ǯǳ  ǳǣ  
Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defenseǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ? ? ?Ǣeinold, Ǯ ǡ  ǡ     -defense Post- ?Ȁ ? ?ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ? ? ?AJIL 244-286; 
Ruys, Armed Attack, 502-507; Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010)Ǥ
 ǮReport of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, ǯȋ ? ? September 2013) UN Doc A/68/382 paras 85- ? ?Ǣ
ǮPromotion           ǯ ȋ ? ? 
2013) UN Doc A/68/389 paras 55-56. Aǡ ǮThe Obama Administration and International ǯ (Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, DC, 25 March 2010) 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm> accessed 20 October 2015. 
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no alternative. In this area, there is no Government we can work with; we have no 
military on the ground to detain those preparing plots; and there was nothing to 
suggest that Reyaad Khan would ever leave Syria or desist from his desire to murder 
us at home, so we had no way of preventing his planned attacks on our country ȏǥȐǡ
airstrike was the only feasible means of effectively disrupting the attacks that had 
been planned and directed. It was therefore necessary and proportionate for the 
individual self-    ǯǤ39 Interestingly, the UN Secretary-
General said in relation to the strikes in Syria:  
ǯ
Syrian Government, but I note that the Government was informed beforehand. I 
also note that the strikes took place in areas no longer under the effective control 
of that Government. I think it is undeniable Ȃ and the subject of broad 
international consensus Ȃ that these extremist groups pose an immediate threat 
to international peace and security.40 
In contrast to the attribution approach discussed in the previous section, tǮable or 
unǯ test moves away from attribution and recognises non-state actors as 
independent authors of armed attacks Ȅand direct targets of self-defence Ȅeven if such 
action takes place on the territory of the host state. Its rationale is the following: states 
have the primary responsibility to prevent and suppress non-state attacks from within 
                                                          
39 HC Deb 7 September 2015, c25-27   
40 Remarks at the Climate Summit press conference (including comments on Syria) Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon, UN Headquarters, 23 September 2014 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=2356#.VjN_J24UPnk. 
(accessed 30 November 2015) 
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their territory but when they are unable or unwilling to fulfil that obligation, the victim 
state can take self-defence action against the non-state actor. 
Although this approach to self-defence addresses the security concerns of states, it is not 
without its problems. The first question to ask concerns the meaning of inability and 
unwillingness; the second question is more fundamental and concerns the nature of the Ǯable or unwillingǯ ; whereas the third question concerns the available 
justifications for infringing tǯ.  
With regard to the first question, Ashley Deeks identified a number of factors that 
should be taken into consideration when assessing whether a state is unable or 
unwilling. Such factors are: the territorial ǯsent or co-operation in suppressing 
or preventing the non-state action; the nature of the threat posed by the non-state actor; 
prior requests to   Ǣ      ǯ
control over its territory and of its capacity to act; proposed means to suppress the 
threat posed by the non-state actor; and prior interactions with the territorial state.41  
These factors are not, however, without complications. First, with regard to ǡ    Ǯ  l state gives the victim state consent, the ǲǳǯǤ42 Questions may be asked as 
to who should grant such consent and whether it should always be granted by the 
government in power irrespective of its legitimacy. For example, the Syrian government 
invited the US to coordinate their actions against ISIL43 but, would the invitation of a 
                                                          
41 ǡǮǯǡ519-532. 
42 Ǯǯǡ519. 
43 Ǯ ?  ǣ     -ǯǡ Foreign Affairs, (March-April 2015)  
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2015-01-25/syrias-president-speaks (accessed 30 
November 2015) 
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government that is engaged in serious violations of international law be valid? Would 
cooperation with such a regime amount to aiding and abetting in the commission of 
crimes? What would happen if the host state grants consent to certain states but not to 
others? Moreover, from a legal perspective, the requirement of prior consent seems to 
make defensive force subsidiary to consensual intervention44 but self-defence and 
consensual intervention45 are independent bases for the use of force in international 
law.  
Second, concerning requests to address the threat posed by non-state actors as 
one of the factors taken into consideration when assessing state inability or 
unwillingness, there is always a very thin line between permissible requests and 
unlawful intervention in that some requests may amount to coercion.46   
Third, it is not clear how a ǯ    to deal with non-
state actors can be assessed. Would the fact that a state deals effectively with the threat 
non-state actors pose but at the expense of human rights or of other international law 
guarantees preclude the operation of this test? How would the debacle of one state 
                                                          
44 Claus KressǡǮThe Fine Line Between Collective Self-Defense and Intervention by Invitation: Reflections     	  ǲǳ  ǯ ȋJust Security, 17 February 2015) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/20118/claus-kreb-force-isil-syria/> accessed at 20 October 2015. 
45 G. Nolte, Intervention by Invitation MPEPIL 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1702?prd=EPIL. 
46 	Ǯ ?Ȁ ? ?ǯǡhis address to Congress made the following demands to ǣǮǡ
over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the 
United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. 
These demands are not open to negation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They 
will hand over the terrorists or they will sh   ǯǤ      
Congress and the American People (20 September 2001) http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htmlǤ 
  ǯ
demands in relation to Chechen fighters as a threat of force or aggression. Letter dated 13 September 2002 
from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN 
Doc A/57/409ȂS/2002/1035 (16 September 2002) 
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claiming that it did all that was required and another state disputing such a claim be 
settled?  
With regard to the second question concerning the nature of  Ǯ ǯ , it is not clear whether it complements the attribution approach or, 
instead, whether it is the only ground for using defensive force against non-state attacks. 
It appears that t Ǯable or unǯ   often projected as if it were the only 
ground for using defensive force against non-state attacks.47 Whether this is the case in 
law is very much debated48 but, the most important obstacle is the fact that according to 
the law self-defence as a right becomes available when an armed attack occurs and not ǮǯǤǡǮable or unǯ
determine the availability of the right to self-defence. It can perhaps condition the 
exercise of this right as part of the necessity calculus but this is a completely different 
thing.49 In other words, it can answer the question of whether force is the only effective 
option available to the victim state when faced with a non-state attack launched from 
another state but in this case it is not an autonomous test, nor the only consideration in 
the necessity calculus. Still it is not clear what is inability and whether it makes self-
                                                          
47 Monica Hakimi, ǮDefensive Force against Non-State Actors: The ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? Intl L Studies 1; 
Ashley Deeks relates the test to self-defence and indeed to the necessity condition of self-defence but the 
article often treats it as an independent test and more or less as a decision-making test removed from the 
legal conditions attendant to self-ǤǡǮǯǤ 
48 ǡǮǯǡ ? ? ?ǢReinold, Ǯǯǡ ? ?ǢKevin Jon Heller, " Ashley ǯ     ǲ  ǳ  ?ǡ  
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/15/ashley-deeks-failure-to-defend-the-unwilling-or-unable-test/ 
 
49 Nicaragua Case paras 194, 237; Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of 
America) [1996] ICJ Rep paras 51, 73Ȃ7; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory 
Opinion of 8 July 1996) ICJ Rep 1996 226 para 41. Judith Gardam, Necessity, proportionality and the use of 
force by States (CUP 2004) 148-154; Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in 
International Law (Juris Publishing 2005) 129; ǡǮǯǡ ? ? ? ?; Yoram 
Dinstein, War, aggression and self-defence (5th edn, CUP 2011) paras 610-612, 729; ǤǡǮ
Necessity and Proportionality of Anti-Terrorist Self-ǯǡ van den Herik and Nico Schrijver 
(eds) Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order (CUP, 2013) 373-422.  
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defence automatically necessary. In sum, the nature of this test and its place in 
international law or in the self-defence matrix is not clear.  
Related to the above is the third question, namely, how the violation of the  ǯ  can be justified under this test? This has not received 
adequate consideration in the literature or in official pronouncements, but one can glean 
a number of assumptions. One assumption is that the violation is part of the Ǯǯas an autonomous test or of the necessity calculus as explained above. In 
other words, the violation of   ǯ sovereignty is necessary in order for the 
victim state to be able to exercise its right to self-defence.50 Although this may be correct 
when the territorial state is the author of the attack, when the territorial state is not the 
author of the attack, a different justification is needed for trespassing its territory 
because in that case the necessity of self-defence justifies the action against the non-
state actor and not against the territorial state which is a third party in the self-defence 
relationshipǤ   ǡ  Ǯable or unǯ      
calculus of self-defence can explain why the use of force against a non-state actor is 
required but cannot justify the violation of the territorial ǯ Ǥ That 
necessity is different from the state of necessity in Article 25 ASR. Secondly, if the 
tǮǯterritory, as is the 
case with Syria, there is the assumption that no violation has occurred because the  ǯ   Ǥ51 This is perhaps what the UN Secretary-
General meant when he said that the US strikes Ǯtook place in areas no longer under the 
                                                          
50 ǡǮCan Non-ǫǯǡǤǡHandbook on the 
Use of Force in International Law, (OUP, 2015) 679-696. 
51 ǡ ?ǫǯ ? ? ?Ǥ 
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ǯ52 and what SC Res 2249 (2015) perhaps alluded to 
when it called upon states to take all necessary measures on the territory under ISIL 
control.53 The British Prime Minister also said with regard to the UK strikes against ISIL 
in Syria that ISIL operates from an ungoverned space and that the objective of the UK 
action is not to attack the Syrian regime.54 Likewise, Israel claimed with regard to its 
2006 action in Lebanon against Hizbollah that its action was not against Lebanon55 since 
its Government had lost control of south Lebanon to Hizbollah something that was 
recognised by most states and by the Security Council.56 The Institut de Droit 
International also recognised the right of self-defence against non-state actors when the ǮǯǤ57  
The problem with such an assumption is that, in international law, actual or 
effective sovereignty is not conterminous with the legal institution of sovereignty, and 
thus  ǯ sovereignty is violated even if the action affects areas not controlled by 
that state.  
Thirdly, when a state is unwilling, there is the implicit assumption of fault, in that the 
territorial state allows Ǯ
                                                          
52 Remarks at the Climate Summit press conference (including comments on Syria) Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon, UN Headquarters, 23 September 2014. See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Separate opinion of Judge Simma) [2005] ICJ Rep para 12; ibid (Separate opinion of Judge 
Kooijmans) para 30. 
53 SC Res 2249 (2015), para 5 
54 Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee (n 8) 9 
55 UNSC Identical letters dated 12 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (12 July 2006) UN Doc 
S/2006/515.  
56 SC Res 1701 (2006); Tom Ruys, Armed Attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 449-457.  
57    ǡ Ǯ       	  nternational Law,   ? ?ǯ ȋ ? ?   ? ? ? ?Ȍ   ? ?ȋȌǤ  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Declaration of Judge Tomka) para 4. 
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ǯ58 which can justify action on its territory.  For example, Russia invoked 
ǯ ponsibilities in order to justify its self-
defence action inside Georgia against Chechen fighters.59 Yet even if the duty of due 
diligence is a corollary to sovereignty and to non-intervention, there is no rule in 
international law that permits forcible intervention or self-defence action when a state 
breaches its duty of due diligence.60 Related to this is another argument that relies on 
the law of neutrality according to which a belligerent can take self-defence action on the 
territory of a neutral state if the latter allows its territory to be used by another 
belligerent in violation of its duties as a neutral state.61 The immediate question is 
whether such a rule can be transposed to the use of force regime and, if that is possible, 
whether the use of force regime has recognised such a rule which is what is debated as 
far as this test is concerned.  
Yoram Dinstein uses a different term to describe the cross-border force against non-       Ǯ  ǯ  Ǥ 	 him, it is Ǯ  ǯ in that the acting state enforces international law 
within the territory of the host state as a form of self-defence. 62  
What transpires from the preceding discussion is Ǯǯapproach 
leaves much unexplained. That having been said, it is    Ǯ 
                                                          
58 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 22, 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 241-2. ǡ Ǯǡǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ?Military Law Review 89, 106-107 
59 ǮLetter dated 11 September 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation 
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
ǯȀ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? ? ?ȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
60 See in this regard the Iǯ Ǥ Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo para 300.  ǡ Ǯ  ǯ ǲǳ  ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?ICLQ 589, 597 
61 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (OUP 1963) 312-314; DW Bowett, Self-
Defence in International Law (Manchester University Press 1958) 167-174; San Remo Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (12 June 1994) art 22 and paras 22.1-22.5. 
62 Dinstein, War, aggression and self-defence, paras 711-733. 
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ǯto self-defence ǮǯǤ63 It 
is premised on the view that the territorial state is responsible for not preventing or 
suppressing non-state attacks and that self-defence is complementary to state action. To 
explain, not only does the unwilling state fail its primary obligation to prevent or 
suppress non-state attacks but is also complicit therein; it thus bears responsibility for 
its complicit acts or omissions although not for the actual armed attack.64 Complicity in 
this case is not an attribution criterion as it is in the attribution approach discussed 
previously but still establishes some form of responsibility of the territorial state. The 
unable state on the other hand is a state that cannot fulfil its obligations and defaults on 
its responsibility. Self-defence then becomes a complementary means of enforcing 
international law. The Ǯǯtest is in other words a jurisdictional test of 
who has primary and who has secondary jurisdiction to enforce international law65 and 
in essence it is ǯǤAs Dinstein 
put it, a state is Ǯ international law extra-ǯǮǯǤ66  Yet, as was said above and will be 
developed further in the sections that follow, self-defence as a primary right is not 
premised on a prior violation of international law but on an occurrence Ȃ an armed 
attack - and, moreover, treating self-defence as a means of enforcing international law is 
not only contrary to the nature of self-defence which is about defence and protection 
from attacks but also conflates self-defence with the law of state responsibility and in 
                                                          
63 ǡǮǯǡ ? ? ? 
64 Articles 2 and 16 ASR. Crawford, ǯ , 80, 
com 94)  
65 ǡǮ	ween Collective Self-ǯǤ 
66 Dinstein, War, aggression and self-defence para 721  
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particular with the institution of countermeasures67 which are decentralised means of 
enforcing international obligations when a state is unable or unwilling to address or 
redress wrongfulness.68  
 
 
Self-defence against non-state actors: the interaction between self-defence as a 
primary rule and self-defence as a secondary rule 
In view of the issues raised in the preceding sections, in this section, I will put 
forward an alternative framework of analysis of self-defence against non-state 
attacks which is based on the interaction between self-defence as a primary rule and 
self-defence as a secondary rule. For this reason, I will first explain the scope self-
defence as primary rule before explaining the scope of its operation as a secondary 
rule.  
 
(i) Self-defence as a primary rule 
As was said, self-defence is recognised as a primary rule in customary law and in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognises  self-defence as an inherent right. As a 
right, it empowers states to use force and such force is lawful per se; it is not a prima 
                                                          
67 Whether forcible countermeasures or reprisals are permitted is debated. See Article 50 ASR but also 
Dis. Op. Simma in Case Concerning Oil Platforms, para.15 
68 Article 49 ASR. Crawford,    ǯ    ǡ 281. 

«-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, [1997] ICJ Rep. 7, para. 83 
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facie violation of the prohibition of the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter which is subsequently exonerated.69  
According to Article 51 of the Charter, the right to self-defence is activated by an 
armed attack. An armed attack is defined as such not because of its author but 
because of its physical attributes.70 Article 51 for instance does not define the 
provenance or the author of the armed attack. Consequently, both states and non-
state actors can commit an armed attack and activate ǯright to self-defence 
which will be directed against the attacking state or the attacking non-state actor.  
The immediate question is when do states become the author of an armed attack? 
A state becomes the actual author of an armed attack if the attack is committed by its 
organs for example by its regular forces. A state may, however, use proxies to commit an 
armed attack. In relation to this, the ICJ 
ǯ
Aggression71 and in particular on Article 3(g) to say that state authorship of an armed 
attack also includes  
the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
                                                          
69 It is interesting to note that the ICJ, in its self-defence jurisprudence, does not examine first the question 
of whether the defensive force is a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This supports the legal 
separateness of the self-defence norm from that on the use of force. See Oil Platforms Case, paras 43-99 
and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo paras 106-147 and 153-165; Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion, para 38. George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force is Justified and 
Why, (OUP, 2008), 30-62 
70 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall Sep Op Higgins, para 33, Sep Op Kooijmans, ibid, para 
35, declaration of Judge Buergenthal, ibid, para 6. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Sep Op of 
Judge Simma, paras 4Ȃ15 , Sep Op Kooijmans ibid paras 19-30,  Declaration of Judge Koroma, ibid, para 9. 
71 ǮDefi  ǯ 
   ? ? ? ? ȋȌ ȋ ? ?   ? ? ? ?Ȍ Ǥ 	   ǯ   Julius Stone, Conflict Through Consensus: United Nations Approaches to Aggression 
(JHUP 1977) 146. See also Nicaragua Case (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel) 168-170.  
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gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its 
substantial involvement therein.72  
The first alternative Ǯǯ refers to situations where groups are part of the 
state apparatus as de facto organs.73 In the same vein, the International Fact Finding      
  Ǯǯ  de facto organs in order to 
determine whether Russia had committed an armed attack against Georgia by sending 
groups to Georgia.74   
ǡǮǯmay refer to de facto organs, as the ICJ opined 
in the Nicaragua case,75 but can also encompass cases where non-state actors are 
prompted, discharged, instigated, instructed or controlled by a state.76 This resembles 
the attribution standard found in Article 8 ASR, which in its previous iteration spoke of 
actions on behalf of a state.77 In the same vein, the International Fact Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia equated effective control over non-state actors ǮǯǤ78 
What transpires is that there is substantive correlation with the attribution tests 
found in the law of state responsibility, in particular with the institutional and agency 
                                                          
72 Nicaragua Case para 195; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo para 146. Tom Ruys, Armed 
Attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter 479-485; Stephanie A Barbour and Zoe A Salzman, ǮǲThe Tangled 
Webǳ: the right of self-defense against non-State actors in the Armed Activities caseǯ (2007Ȃ8) 40 NYU J 
Intl L and Policy 53Ȃ106. 
73 Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), 1415; P Lamberti-Zanardi, Ǯ  ǯ    ȋȌǡ The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986) 112.  
74 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (vol II September 2009) 258-
260. 
75 Nicaragua Case para 109. 
76 YBILC (vol II, Part One) 1974 283. 
77 YBILC 1974 (vol I) 152- ? ? ?ǤǮFirst report on State responsibility, by Mr. James Crawford, Special ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌȀǤ ?Ȁ ? ? ?Ǥ ?Ȃ7 paras 193-215. 
78 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (vol II September 2009) 258-
260. 
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test. The rationale is however completely different. Here it is about state authorship of 
an attack79 whereas in the attribution approach as discussed previously, it is about the Ǯǯ -state attack through attribution.80 It is for this reason that 
certain authors speak of primary rules of attribution in contrast to the secondary rules 
of attribution contained in the law of state responsibility.81 The difference between the 
two approaches (attribution vs authorship) becomes even more pronounced in the case  Ǯ ǯ, which does not correspond to any of the attribution tests 
promulgated in the law of state responsibility and is neither an attribution nor a 
derivative standard but establishes direct, albeit constructive, authorship of an armed 
attack.82 Put another way, it is about  ǯ involvement in the attack by virtue of 
which the state becomes its author.  
  Ǯ ǯ. International 
jurisprudence is not particularly helpful in this regard; it has not clarified the issue and 
often equates substantial involvement with attribution. In the Nicaragua case for 
example, the ICJ required high degree and specificȄnot generalȄinvolvement, 
effectively amounting to agency.83 The Court  Ǯ ǥ n the form of the   ǡ     ǯ   Ǥ84 Judge 
Jennings and Judge Schwebel were very critical in their dissenting opinions of the ǯ   Ǯ ǯǤ  Judge Jennings said, Ǯ 
                                                          
79 It should also be recalled that the Definition of Aggression is about state authorship of aggression and 
not about responsibility. 
80 	ǡǮǯ,  270-1. 
81 Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, 1417. 
82 Tal Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing , 2006, 176-185. 
83 Nicaragua Case para 115.  
84 Nicaragua Case paras 195, 226-231. The ILC in a previous iteration seems to adopt a lower threshold 
than the one advocated by the Court that resembled the overall control criterion. YBILC (Vol II) 1975 p. 
80. 
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            ǥ ȏ Ȑ 
nevertheless be an important element in what might be thought to amount to an armed ǯ. He went on to say that  
Logistical support may itself be crucial. ǥ [It] covers the Ǯart of moving, lodging, 
and supplying troops and equipmentǯ ǥ If there is added to all this Ǯother 
supportǯ, it becomes difficult to understand what it is, short of direct attack by a 
Stateǯs own forces, that may not be done apparently without a lawful response in 
the form of ǥ self defence.85 
Moreover, Ǯ ǯ     in  ǯ
jurisprudence. In the Armed Activities case, for example, the ICJ   Ǯǯ Ǯǯ ; 
although it duly mentioned it as part of the definition of armed attack.86 Similarly, in the 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion the Court spoke of 
imputation of armed attacks and did not even use its own definition of an armed attack 
developed in previous cases, such as in the Nicaragua case.87 Likewise, the International 
Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia ignored the Ǯsubstantial involvementǯ 
criterion.  
That said, iǮǯfor constructing 
state authorship of an armed attack, it should be given full effect: and for this reason it 
                                                          
85 Nicaragua Case (Dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings) 543-44; ibid (Dissenting opinion of 
Judge Schwebel) para 154 et seq. See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Counter-
memorial of Uganda) (21 April 2001) para 359. 
86 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo para 146. See ibid (Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc 
Kateka) paras 13Ȃ15, 24-34. 
87 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, para 139. 
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should not only be distinguished frǮǯǮǯ, but its content needs to 
be defined.  
It is submitted that Ǯsubstantial ǯincludes any aid or assistance in the 
form of acts or omissions given by a state to a non-state actor that substantially 
contributes to the commission of the armed attack, provided that the state knows that 
the non-state actor is willing to commit attacks and that the aid or assistance facilitates 
them. Such assistance may include, for example: material support, planning and 
preparations; selection of targets; intelligence sharing for particular attacks; provision of 
technical advice for specific attacks; provision of Ǯ ǯ  sanctuary88; and 
training, but also more general support which, over time, may amount to substantial 
involvement.89  
In sum, substantial involvement is about state input that contributes qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively in a non-incidental manner to the armed attack but, and this is the   Ǯǯ  Ǯ ǯ, does not require direct effectuation of the 
attack, as the ICJ seemed to require in the Nicaragua case,90 neither does it require any 
kind of effective control over the non-state actor.91 Substantial involvement amounting 
                                                          
88 ǡǮ-defence against an actual or imminent armed attack by non-ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
106 AJIL 769, in particular principle 7. 
89 ǡǮǣ
Israeli and U.S. Measures of Self-Defense?ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?Georgetown J of Intl L  411; Simma, The Charter of the 
United Nations 1418-19. 
90 For a similar approach to the aiding and abetting modes of liability in international criminal law see 
©(Appeal Judgment) ICTY-94-1-A, A Ch (15 July 1999) 229. Contra Prosecutor v Charles 
Ghankay Taylor (Appeal Judgement) SCSL-2003-01-A (23 September 2013) para 478. 
91 This is also the case in international criminal law. See Prosecutor v Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic 
(Appeal Judgement) ICTY-02-60-A (9 May 2007) para 195; Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, supra, 
para 370. 
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to constructive authorship does not in other words envisage the state as the dominant 
power behind the non-state actor but as a facilitator.92 
Even if Ǯubstantial involvementǯ is quite broad as far as means and methods are 
concerned and takes a macro view of state actions and/or omissions,93 it is narrowed 
down by the knowledge requirement. Knowledge does not include knowledge of the 
specific attack, because in that case it would transform knowledge into purpose, but 
requires knowledge of the non- ǯ     and of the 
contribution thereto of such assistance.  
The inclusion of omissions     Ǯ ǯ may 
appear to contradict the ǯinterpretation of aiding and assisting as requiring positive 
action.94 It has also been claimed that toleration and harbouring falls below the 
threshold of Ǯsubstantial involvementǯ.95 In the opinion of the author, there should be a 
case-by-case but also contextual assessment of whether a specific omission amounts to 
substantive involvement.  If, for example, a state tolerates a non-state actor who uses its 
territory for training or recruiting purposes, for acquiring resources or as a base of their 
operations and such omissions enable that non-state actor to mount an armed attack on 
another state, this can amount to substantial involvement provided that the state was 
aware of the willingness of the non-state actor to commit attacks and that its omission 
contributed thereto.96 Under different circumstances, toleration or harbouring may fall 
                                                          
92 Bosnia Genocide Case, Dis.Op. Judge Mahiou paras. 115-117. 
93 Judge Schwebel spoke of cumulative actions constituting substantial involvement. Nicaragua Case 
(Dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel) para 171. 
94 Bosnia Genocide Case para 432. 
95 Lamberti-ǡ Ǯǯ ? ? ?ǢǡArmed Attack and Article 51 of the UN 
Charter 388-9. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans) para 
22.  
96 See Ian Brownlie in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Public sitting held on Monday 18 April 
2005, CR 2005/7, para 80. 
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below the threshold of substantial involvement and constitute a violation of a stateǯs 
general duty of due diligence or of a stateǯs treaty or customary law obligations to 
prevent certain activities from its territory.  
One may then ask when does an omission constitute constructive authorship and 
when does it constitute dereliction of  ǯ duty of due diligence?97 The difference 
lies in the fact that due diligence is an obligation of conduct98 and as such it is dependent 
on state capacity, whereas, for substantial involvement, capacity is irrelevant. What 
matters is the level of contribution the omission makes to the non-state attack. Secondly, 
substantial involvement translates into constructive authorship of the attack whereas 
according to the obligation of due diligence, a state is responsible for its own failure and 
not for its contribution to the acts of non-state actors. Third, whereas a state will evade 
responsibility if it meets its due diligence obligation even if the impugned act occurs, the 
occurrence of a non-state attack combined with  ǯ substantial involvement will 
make the latter the author of the attack and the target of the self-defence action. Finally, 
due diligence requires knowledge or constructive knowledge of wrongful activities, 
whereas substantial involvement requires knowledge of the willingness to commit 
attacks and of the contribution thereto. 
The inclusion of omissions in the form of toleration and harbouring in the 
constructive authorship of armed attacks can also be supported by the General 
Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and the General Assembly 
Friendly Relations Declaration, which include a provision to the effect that  
                                                          
97 Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein, ǮThe Limits of Complicity as a Ground for Responsibility: Lessons 
Learned from the Corfu Channel Caseǯ, in K Bannelier et al. (eds), The ICJ and the Evolution of International 
Law (Routledge 2011) 331-332; Vladyslav ǡ Ǯ     ǯ in 
André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds), Principles of shared responsibility in international law: an 
appraisal of the state of the art (CUP 2015) 145-148. 
98 Bosnia Genocide Case, para 221. 
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every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing 
in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of 
such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or 
use of force.99  
These resolutions were relied upon by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case100 and Armed 
Activities case101 in order to determine and indeed expand the meaning of Ǯprohibited 
forceǯǡ whereas the Definition of Aggression was used to determine and indeed expand 
the meaning of Ǯarmed attackǯ. All these resolutions have a common denominator: they 
are concerned with the use of force and with forms of state involvement therein.102 The 
Court then went on to distinguish between the different types of force on the basis of 
gravity with grave uses of force being categorised as armed attacks triggering self-
defence action.103 Ǯǯ104 adumbrated in the aforementioned 
resolutions are to have any rational coherence, the types of force described in the 
Declaration on Non-Intervention and the Declaration on Friendly Relations can be used    Ǯǯ criterion in Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression. 
Accordingly, state involvement in the form of organizing, instigating, assisting, 
participating or acquiescing in the use of force by non-state actors described in the 
                                                          
99 
Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ? ?Ȍ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ǮDeclaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation           ǯ ȋ ? ?   ? ? ? ?Ȍ  
A/RES/25/2625. 
100 Nicaragua Case paras 191, 195, 227-231. 
101 Armed Activities Case paras 147 163-165. 
102 The Court did not believe that there was a clear demarcation between these resolutions. For example, it      	    Ǯ[a]longside certain descriptions which may 
refer to aggression,                Ǥǯ
Nicaragua Case, para 191. 
103 Nicaragua Case para 191. 
104 ǡǮǯȋȌǡInternational Law and 
Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines (BRILL 2007) 45-73. 
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Declaration on Friendly Relations will amount to an armed attack and to constructive 
authorship if the particular state involvement is substantial, the non-state actor commits 
an armed attack instead of a use of force and there is knowledge by the state. Otherwise 
there is no logical consistency in saying that a state becomes the author of a use of force 
when it instigates, organises, assists, participates or acquiesces to the non-state use of 
force but does not become the author of an armed attack when it substantially acts in 
the same way vis-à-vis groups that go on to commit an armed attack. The inclusion of 
such activities within the scope of self-defence is also corroborated by the African 
ǯ -Aggression and Common Defence Pact, which expressly qualifies the 
harbouring of terrorists, as well as any provision of support for them, as an act of 
aggression105 that leads to common defence106; and in Security Council Resolution 1378, 
which mentioned the Friendly Relations Resolution in the context of self-defence.  
Equally important is Article 3(f) of the Definition of Aggression, according to 
which an act of aggression is committed if a state allows its territory to be used by 
another state to attack a third state. The essence of this provision is to transform an 
otherwise act of assistance into an act of aggression by the assisting state. The ICJ did 
not refer to this provision when defining an Ǯǯ it should be noted that 
the ICJ did not engage in any comprehensive interpretation of the Definition of 
Aggression, neither does the resolution define an armed attack as such.107 In other 
words, it is open to interpretation and there is nothing to preclude the use of this 
                                                          
105 The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact 
http://www.au.int/en/content/african-union-non-aggression-and-common-defence-pact 
   ?ȋȌȋȌǣ ǲ    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ǡ ǡ
harbouring or provision of any assistance for the commission of terrorist acts and other violent trans-
national organized crimes against a ǳǤ 
106 Article 4 of the Pact . 
107 Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, 1406-9. 
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provision to establish state authorship of an armed attack.108 Even if Article 3(f) refers 
to states, in view of the aims of the declaration and the fact that non-state actors mount 
attacks from state territories, it stands to reason to apply it by analogy to non-state 
actors.109  
In summary, what constitutes state authorship of an armed attack is quite broad 
and includes actual as well as constructive authorship under the label of substantial 
involvement. In all these cased, the victim state can use force by way of self-defence 
against the perpetrator state. If, however, the assistance provided to non-state actors 
does not amount to substantial involvement, the assisting state does not become the 
author of the armed attack but it may be held responsible for violating assorted 
international law obligations arising from treaties, customary law, Security Council 
resolutions or from the duty of due diligence.  
If a non-state actor commits an armed attack independently from states or when 
there is insubstantial state involvement, the non-state actor becomes the author of the 
attack and consequently the target of self-defence, according to self-defence as a 
primary rule. In this case, because the self-defence action is carried out on the territory 
of a state that is not the author of the armed attack, it violates obligations owned to that 
state. It is at this juncture that self-defence as a secondary rule becomes operative.  
 
(ii) Self-defence as a secondary rule  
                                                          
108 S.A. Alexandrov, Self-Defense against the Use of Force in International Law (Kluwer, 1996) 114. 
109 Simma, The Charter of the United Nations,1418; ǡ ?ǫǯ578. 
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It was James Crawford, the last Special Rapporteur on the topic of state 
responsibility, who made explicit the distinction between self-defence as a primary 
norm codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter and in customary law and self-defence as a 
secondary norm.110 Roberto Ago, who is credited with that distinction, treated self-
defence exclusively as a secondary rule. According to Ago, all violations of international 
law give rise to international responsibility unless they can be justified.111 Thus, any use 
of force in principle violates the primary international law obligation prohibiting the use 
of force unless such use of force can be justified by the existence of a justificatory 
circumstance as it is self-defence. As Ago opined:  
Acting in self-defence means responding by force to forcible wrongful action 
carried out by another; and the only reason why such a response is not itself 
wrongful is that the action which provoked it was wrongful.112  
For this reason, he also confined self-defence to an armed attack by another state, and 
excluded an attack by private individuals, because only states are bound by the 
primary rule prohibiting the use of force.113  
	ǯ to self-defence, Article 21 ASR codified self-
defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness (CPW).114 The role of CPW is to 
                                                          
110 Crawford, The International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, Article 21 commentary, 
166, para 1 and 2. Also J. Crawford, Second Report on State responsibility 1999 A/CN.4/498, para 296. 
111 YBILC (vol II, part I) 1971 214ff; YBILC (vol II, part II) 1973 179ff; YBILC (vol II, part II) 1980 pp.52-61; 
YBILC (vol I, pt I) 1980, pp.13-70.  
112 YBILC (vol II, pt II) 1980 54, para 88. Contra Andriy Ushakov in YBILC (vol I) 1980 190, paras 16-17. 
See also Nicaragua Case paras 74, 193, 195, 211. 
113 YBILC (vol I) 1980 184, para 3. Contra Schwebel YBILC (vol 1) 1980 192, para 5.  
114  ǡ Ǯ-ǯ    et al (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP, 
Oxford 2010) 461; Fede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   ǯ  ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ  ?Ǣ    ǡ Ǯ  -t-elle sa place dans un code sur la responsabilitƲ ǫǯ 
Constantinides and N Zaikos (eds), The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor 
Kalliopi K Koufa (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2009) 519; ƴ    ǡ Ǯ
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relieve states from responsibility in certain unusual circumstances in view of the fact 
that the law of state responsibility as codified by the ILC is not based on fault. CPW 
thus refer to an event or situation whose occurrence precludes the wrongfulness of the 
violation by the affected state of certain of its obligations, leading to non-
responsibility.  
  
Before identifying the specific obligations whose violation is exonerated by self-
defence, it should be stressed that the scope of self-defence as a secondary norm is 
limited to the exigencies of the specific state of affairs created by self-defence. Article 21 
ASR thus refers to violations of certain obligations committed in the course of self-
defence which are strictly occasioned by it and are incidental to the exercise of self-
defence. 115  As the last Special Rapporteur put it,  
in the course of self-defence, a State may violate other obligations towards the 
aggressor. For example, it may trespass on its territory, interfere in its internal 
affairs, disrupt its trade contrary to the provisions of a commercial treaty, etc.116 
If self-defence as a CPW were to apply to any violation of international law committed in 
the course of  self-defence, then it would not only exceed its exigencies but its scope 
would become so broad that could potentially destabilise the international legal order. 
Consequently, any action by the defending state that is not related to the use of 
defensive force and is not strictly occasioned by it, for example, the suspension or 
                                                                                                                                                                                     ƴ ƴ        ?ƴ ƴ ǯ  R Kherad (ed), ±± ȋ
ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ ? ? ? Ǣƴ Ǯ ? ?ƴ ƴ" : une illusion optique?ǯO Corten 
et al (edsȌǡǡǣ± (Bruylant, 2007) 223  
115 Article 21 ASR commentary para 2. It does not however cover oblig  Ǯ ǯǤ Art 21 
Commentary, para 3. 
116 Crawford, Second Report on State responsibility, 1999 A/CN.4/498, para 297, 299.  
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termination of treaties or the adoption of measures against the attacking state, needs to 
be justified by other rules of international law in order to be lawful. Such actions may, 
for example, be justified by the law of treaties and in particular by the rule on changing 
circumstances (rebus sic stantibus);117 they may additionally be justified as 
countermeasures.118 
Which are then those international law obligations whose incidental breach in the 
course of self-defence can be exonerated by the application of Article 21ASR? As the 
aforementioned statement by the Special Rapporteur indicates, they refer to the 
obligation of respect of sovereignty and the obligation of non-intervention but, does 
Article 21 ASR also cover the obligation not to use force? It should be recalled that in 
international law they form a concentric circle of obligations protecting states and the 
ICJ has treated them as being separate. Moreover, the ICJ has consistently held that, even 
if a specific conduct does not breach the norm on the non-use of force, it can still violate 
the non-intervention norm or the norm of respect of sovereignty.119  
Yet, a distinction needs to be made between the state that is the author of the armed 
attack and the state that is not the author of the armed attack but on whose territory the 
self-defence action against the non-state author of the attack takes place. With regard to 
the former, Article 21 ASR does not apply to these obligations because the use of force is 
lawful per se according to the primary rule of self-defence120 which also justifies the 
breach ǯsovereignty and intervention. In the same vein, the ICJ if 
                                                          
117 Article 61 and 62 VCLT. Contra   ǡ Ǯƴ ƴ ǯ, 253; Christakis and ǡǮƴƴ -t-ǯǡ ? ? ?Ǥ 
118 Articles 49-54 ASR 
119 Corfu Channel Case, 35; Nicaragua Case, para 205 
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there is a claim of self-defence it only deals with legality of the action according to the 
criteria contained in the primary rule and has never enquired whether the use of 
defensive force is a prima facie violation of the norm prohibiting the use of force or a 
violation of the target stateǯ sovereignty or of the non-intervention norm. With regard 
to the state that authored the armed attack, Article 21 ASR can instead cover other 
obligations related to and incidentally breached by the use of defensive force, for 
example, a treaty obligation the breach of which was incidental to the defensive action 
as was the Treaty of Amity between the USA and Iran, which became a cause of 
contention in the Oil Platforms case.121  
Article 21 ASR however acquires full meaning in cases where the self-defence 
action unfolds on the territory of a state that has not authored the armed attack. The 
self-defence action in that case gives rise to two sets of relations: the first set concerns 
the relation between the defending state and the attacking non-state actor, which falls 
under the primary rule of self-defence; whereas the second set concerns the relation 
between the defending state and the territorial state, where action on its territory is 
incidental to the self-defence action but may violate obligations owed to that state. In 
this case, the territorial state is a third party in the self-defence duel.  
The ILC left the question of whether Article 21 ASR extends to third states 
open122 but it is submitted here that self-defence as a secondary rule in the law of state 
responsibility is critical in such a situation because the primary rule of self-defence 
relates to the non-state author of the attack and cannot justify the trespassing of the  ǯ       territorial state is the author of the 
                                                          
121 Oil Platforms, Preliminary Objections, para 21. 
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attack. The application of Article 21 ASR to third states is also supported by a number of 
other considerations. One is historical and relates to the context from which this rule 
emerged which concerns the laws of war and the rights of third states.123 The second 
concerns certain modern practices, namely the use of self-defence to justify violations of 
obligations towards third states in the context of maritime exclusion zones124 or, in the 
context of forcible interdiction at sea.125  
With regard to the territorial state, Article 21 ASR does not apply to the 
obligation not to use force. Such force does not fall within the terms of Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter. To explain, it falls below the qualifications contained in Article 2(4) and is 
not intended to coerce the territorial state,126 instead, it is limited and targeted and its 
aim is to defend against attacks emanating from the territory of that state. It does not 
also constitute unlawful intervention because it lacks a coercive element.127 State 
practice corroborates this view. States taking self-defence action against non-state 
actors on the territory of another state go to great lengths to confirm that the action is 
not against the host state (or its government) but against the non-state actor.128 For 
example, the British Prime Minister declared that the purpose of the action against ISIL ǮǮǯǤ129 With regard to the 2006 action in 
                                                          
123 ARS Commentary to art 21, para 5. 
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O. Corten, The Law Against War, 76-92. 
127 Nicaragua Case para 205. 
128 For example with regard to the 1998 US action against al Queda in Sudan and Afghanistan see UN Doc. 
S/1998/780; with regard to the 2006 Israeli action in Lebanon see UN Doc. S/PV.5489, 6. 
129 Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 9  
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Lebanon, Israel claimed that its action was against Hizbollah and not against Lebanon130 
and made the same claim in relation to its 1982 action against PLO in Lebanon131 and in 
relation to its bombardment of the PLO headquarters in Tunisia.132 
Instead, such use of force can violate   ǯ . This is 
corroborated by state practice. For example, Syria, as mentioned at the beginning of this 
article, claimed that the allied action violated its sovereignty and not the non-use of 
force norm. Iraq condemned the 2007Ȃ2008 Turkish incursions into Iraq against the 
PKK as a violation of its sovereignty but not as a use of force133 and used the same 
language with regard to previous Turkish excursions.134 With regard to ǯ    	ǡ       Ǯviolation of ǯ  ǯ      -defence only against the 
rebels.135 Similarly, the OAS Foreign Ministers condemned the operat Ǯa violation 
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international 
lawǯǤ136 Pakistan condemned the US operations in its northern territory as violations of 
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United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council UN Doc S/2008/146 (3 March 2008). 
136 OAS, ǮConvocation of the meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs and appointment of a 
commissionǯ, 5 March 2008, Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP.RES.930 (1632/08). 
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its territorial integrity.137 Finally, in relation to the 1998 US action in Sudan and ǡǮa 
blatant violation of the sovereignty of a State member of the League of Arab States, and ǯǤ138   
 It is to such incidental violation of the territorial ǯ
21 ASR applies and exonerates the breach, provided that the self-defence action is 
lawful.139 To explain, the action needs to be in reaction to an armed attack and should 
satisfy the conditions of necessity and proportionality.140 The necessity condition 
requires, among others, that the action targets the non-state actor and that only 
incidentally affects assets or persons belonging to the territorial state if engaging them is 
necessary for the effective exercise of this right against the non-state actor.141 If the self-
defence action does not comply with these requirements or the state continues to use 
force against a non-state actor after the conditions of self-defence have elapsed, this 
would constitute a breach of the primary norm of self-defence whereas vis-à-vis the 
territorial state, it will constitute a breach of the prohibition of the use of force and of the 
obligation to respect sovereignty. Article 21 ASR would not apply in these cases.142  
                                                          
137 ǤǡǮ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/15/us-drone-strikes-pakistan. Ruys, Armed Attack, 472. 
138   ? ?  ? ? ? ?  ǯǤǤ    
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council S/1998/78921 (August 1998).  
139 Article 21 commentary para 6. 
140 For example, with regard to the US action in Sudan and Afghanistan, see Letter dated 20 August 1998 
from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, S/1998/780 (20 August 1998). 
141 Dinstein, War, aggression and self-defence, 275-7; paras 728-733; ǡ Ǯ  
Proportionality of Anti-Terrorist Self-ǯǡ373; R. WedgwoǡǮǣǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?Yale J Intl L, 359; Chatham Principles, Principle C and E. 
142 It is interesting to note that with regard to certain coalition actions the government of Syria declared 
that they constitut Ǯ ǯǤ Identical letters dated 7 December 2015 from the Permanent 
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the 
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The immediate question is what legal consequences flow from the application of 
Article 21 ASR to such incidental breaches of state sovereignty? These depend on the 
legal   Ǯ  ǯǤ143 The ILC is rather 
ambivalent in this regard and uses almost interchangeably ǮǯǮǯǤ144 Justification alludes to a legally non-objectionable act, in other words, to 
a lawful act, whereas excuse alludes to an unlawful act that is excused because of certain 
special circumstances. Such an excuse may refer to the act itself or to the ensuing 
responsibility. If the excuse refers to the act, excusing its wrongfulness, it acts as 
justification. If the excuse refers to the responsibility of the author of the act, it means 
that the act is unlawful but responsibility is excused because of the intervening special 
circumstance. The latter approach is in line with the rationale of the law of state 
responsibility and its distinction between primary and secondary norms. Whereas 
justifications relate to substantive rules that is, to primary norms, excuses relate to 
secondary rules concerning the consequences arising from violations of primary rules. 
Self-defence as CPW is thus an excuse and as such it excuses the responsibility of the 
defending state for the incidental breach of obligations occasioned by the defensive use 
of force. Although it recognises that the intrusion is in principle a breach of the host 
stateǯ sovereignty, responsibility is mitigated because of the state of affairs created by 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
President of the Security Council, S/2015/933 (8 December 2015). In subsequent communications it just 
listed the coalition actions without qualifying them. See Identical letters dated 10 December 2015  from the 
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council, S/2015/950 (14 December 2015) 
143 ǤǤǤǡǮǯǤǤǤǡJustification and Excuse in Criminal 
Law (Garland Publishing, New York, 1994), 31; Ǥ ǡ Ǯ   ǣ   ǯ  ? ?EJIL ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ  ? ? ?Ǣ Ǥ ǡ Ǯ± ǯ   ǫ  ±  ǯǡLa nécessité en droit international, Société Française de droit international, (Paris, Pedone, 
2007), 11, at 45- ? ?ǢǤǡǮNecessity and the Use of Force: A Special Regime Ǯ ? ?etherlands YBIL 
(2010), 11, 39-42 
144 Crawford,    ǯ    ǡ 5-6, 160-162; James 
Crawford, Addendum to Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A.CN.4/498/Add.2, (Apr. 30, 
1999), paras 214-229; ǤǡǮ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the non-state armed attack. This approach is corroborated by state practice. Although 
territorial states such as Syria branded the actions as violation of their sovereignty, they 
did not take any measures to enforce their responsibility. Moreover, the Security Council 
also seems to have exonerated states from responsibility in resolution 2249 (2015) by 
calling upon ǮMember States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary 
measures, in compliance with international law, in particular with the United Nations ǡǥǤǯǡǯǤTo the extent that most states invoked self-defence to justify their actions and such 
actions incidentally breached Syriǯsovereignty, the Security Councilǯ
interpreted as exonerating states, at least politically, from any responsibility. It is also 
interesting to note that the General Assembly has not criticised such actions. The 
reaction of these two bodies is important because they often play the role of world-wide Ǯǯ of the propriety of particular actions.145  
   Even if responsibility is excused by virtue of Article 21 ASR, the issue of 
compensation remains open.146 The host state may thus request compensation for any 
damage caused in the course of the self-defence action.147 This is fair and proper because 
otherwise the territorial state will be unnecessarily disadvantaged.  
 
                                                          
145 T.M. Franck, Recourse to Force, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) 190-191 
146 Article 27 ASR 
147 For example, Iraq condemned the violation of its sovereignty following a Turkish self-defence 
operation against PKK and declared that it will demand compensation  for the damage caused by these 
Turkish breaches and violations of Iraq's territory and airspace and for the human suffering inflicted on ǯǤIdentical Letters Dated 14 June 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United 
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council UN Doc S/1997/461 
(16 June 1997)  
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Conclusion  
     Ǯ  ǯ  to self-defence 
against non-state attacks suffer from practical and normative weaknesses, the author 
put forward an alternative framework to deal with non-state attacks based on self-
defence as a primary rule that  justifies the use of force against the non-state author of 
an armed attack; and self-defence as a secondary rule in the law of state responsibility           ǯ
sovereignty in the course of self-defence. This framework provides a conceptually 
coherent reading of self-defence as applied to non-state attacks.  
 
